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this view, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of meaning in life. 
First, !
that one be passionate about, or love, something one is doing. (The Passion 
Requirement.) !
One must, that is, be “gripped or excited”  by the activity in question, as opposed to 4
being “bored or alienated”  by everything about it. Being gripped or excited by 5
something one is doing, in turn, Wolf tells us, involves having “good feelings”, but 
does not guarantee being happy.  Second, 6!
that the activity in question is objectively good. (The Objectivity Requirement.) !
The activity, that is, must have a value that is “independent of and has its source 
outside of oneself”, or, in other words, a value that “does not depend on one’s own 
contingent interest in [it]”.  It must be good in some way other than being good for 7
oneself. 
Wolf nicely sums up her view in the following slogan: !
Meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness.  8!
In this paper, I will argue that both of Wolf’s requirements are mistaken. On the 
theory I will defend, Consequentialism about Meaning in Life (or CML for short), !
(1) one’s life is meaningful at time t just in case one’s surviving at t would be 
good in some way (either subjectively or objectively), !
and !
(2) one’s life was meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was (or 
will be) made better in some way for one’s having existed. !
In Section II, I will argue that passion is not necessary for meaning in life, because an 
ability to contribute to objectively good things is sufficient for it.  In Section III, I will 9
argue that an ability to contribute to subjectively good things (i.e., things whose value 
depends on one’s own contingent interest in them) is also sufficient for one’s life to be 
meaningful at a time. 
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 When I refer to an ability to contribute to good things, I mean just that one’s surviving 9
would have good consequences. What matters for the meaningfulness of my life now, 
according to CML, is how the world would go were I to survive, not how it might go. If, were 
I to survive, I would give none of my spare millions to Oxfam, my ‘ability’ to do so 
contributes nothing to my life’s being meaningful now.
!
II. THE PASSION REQUIREMENT !
I will first respond to three arguments for the passion requirement. I will then provide 
three objections to it. !
Sisyphus Who Scares Away Vultures !
Consider, says Wolf, a modified version of Sisyphus, whose rock rolling, 
unbeknownst to him, “scares away vultures who would otherwise attack a nearby 
community and spread terror and disease” . Such a Sisyphus is contributing to 10
objectively good things, but his life nonetheless seems completely meaningless. 
But his life does not seem completely meaningless to me! Indeed, it seems to 
have a great deal of meaning owing to its good consequences for the villagers. 
Suppose this Sisyphus, in the grip of a crisis of meaning, were about to throw himself 
off the mountain, but we had one last chance to communicate with him. Here’s what I 
would say: “Wait, Sisyphus! Don’t do it! You don’t realise it, but your rock rolling is 
averting a great deal of suffering. It’s scaring off vultures that would otherwise attack 
nearby villagers and spread disease.” This seems like a perfectly appropriate thing to 
say, and its clear implication is that his life has meaning – meaning that he hasn’t been 
aware of. In telling him about the vultures, I’d be helping him to discover some 
meaning that his life already has. 
But if Wolf were right that passion is necessary for meaning, then there would be 
no positive news to give Sisyphus. If he were to look to the heavens and cry, “O ye 
gods, what reason have I to live?”, we ought to remain silent. He has no passion for 
anything he is doing, and so, on Wolf’s view, no reason to go on living. This, it seems 
to me, is highly implausible.  Indeed, it is obvious – isn’t it? – that depressed people 11
can be wrong that their lives are meaningless. If Wolf’s view were correct, then any 
passionless person who wonders whether his life has any meaning is conceptually 
confused – if he knew what meaningfulness required, he would know that it didn’t 
have any! We can put the point in a slightly different way: A depressed person already 
knows he is depressed, he is wondering precisely whether he is right to feel this way. 
Undoubtedly, passion is important in our lives, and we often yearn for it if we 
have none. Indeed, as I will be arguing in Section III, there is something similar to 
passion that suffices for meaning at a time. But it is a mistake to think that just 
because somebody is yearning for passion he is yearning for meaning. He may yearn 
for passion, while being in no doubt of the meaningfulness of his life. Consider !
The Master Economist. Alice spends her days managing the economy, something 
only she (given her talents) can do. She finds it utter drudgery, but knows she 
must continue because of all the good she is doing. 
!
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Alice may yearn for passion in her life, while having no doubt – not for one minute – 
of its considerable meaningfulness. 
Related to this, it is vital not to confuse one’s life’s being meaningful with one’s 
having a sense of meaning in one’s life. Whatever exactly the latter involves (whether 
it is simply a belief that one’s life has meaning, or such a belief combined with a 
certain kind of positive feeling) one can surely have it without having any actual 
meaning in one’s life.  12!
The Crises of Tolstoy and Mill !
R. W. Hepburn writes: !
To give life meaning cannot be just a matter of pursuing worthy projects, for that 
account fails to cope with phenomena like Tolstoy’s arrest of life, or John Stuart 
Mill’s during his mental crisis of 1826.  13!
Hepburn’s worry is that, if making a contribution to objectively good things were 
sufficient for meaning in life, then it would be inexplicable how Tolstoy and Mill, 
who surely could not have doubted the worth of their projects, suffered crises. 
However, the memoirs of both Tolstoy and Mill reveal that they suffered their 
respective crises only after doubting the value or worth of their projects. In A 
Confession, Tolstoy writes !
Amidst my thoughts of farming, which interested me very much during that time, 
there would suddenly pass through my head a question like this: “All right, you 
are going to have six thousand desyatinas of land in the Government of Samara, 
and three hundred horses, – and then?” And I completely lost my senses and did 
not know what to think farther. Or, when I thought of the education of my 
children, I said to myself: “Why?” Or, reflecting on the manner in which the 
masses might obtain their welfare, I suddenly said to myself: “What is that to 
me?” Or, thinking of the fame which my works would get me, I said to myself: 
“All right, you will be more famous than Gogol, Pushkin, Shakespeare, Moliere, 
and all the writers in the world, – what of it?” And I was absolutely unable to 
make any reply. The questions were not waiting, and I had to answer them at 
once; if I did not answer them, I could not live.  14!
Here, Tolstoy seems to be attributing his crisis of meaning to doubts about the worth 
of his farming, his children’s education, his writing, and the welfare of the masses for 
which he had been striving for so long. 
What led him to doubt the worth of these things? He says it was thoughts of 
mortality (both his own and others). He writes: 
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Sooner or later there would come diseases and death (they had come already) to 
my dear ones and to me, and there would be nothing left but stench and worms. 
All my affairs, no matter what they might be, would sooner or later be forgotten, 
and I myself should not exist. So why should I worry about all these things?  15!
In Tolstoy’s case, then, it seems that thoughts of mortality led him to question the 
worth of his activities, which, in turn, gave rise to his crisis of meaning. Only then did 
he lose passion for his activities. He is, then, properly understood, a counterexample 
to the views of Hepburn and Wolf. 
As for Mill, he explicitly put his crisis down to a feeling that the end to which he 
was devoting his life, the progress of humanity, was worthless. He writes: !
The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in 
the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for...[The] destiny of mankind in 
general was ever in my thoughts...I felt that unless I could see my way to some 
better hope than this for human happiness in general, my dejection must 
continue.  16!
Mill, it is true, lost all passion for his activities. But this occurred only after and 
because he came to doubt the worth or point of them. !
The Result Machine !
Thaddeus Metz asks us to consider a thought experiment of Robert Nozick’s, The 
Result Machine, which can be programmed to bring about any outcome whatever. If a 
consequentialist theory (like CML) were true, Metz says,  !
then a maximally meaningful life would be one that programmed the machine, or 
pushed the relevant buttons, so as to bring about as much objective value as it 
could.  17!
However, he claims, !
That judgment is counterintuitive. Even if it were the case that one ought to get 
the machine running, one’s life would not be maximally meaningful for having 
done so. Instead, a fully meaningful life, insofar as it involves the promotion of 
objective value, requires effortful or hands on activity.  18!
He then offers a similar case of his own: !
!
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Less fantastically, merely cutting a check to Oxfam, donating funds that one was 
lucky to inherit, would not be as meaningful as laboring in the poor community 
that Oxfam seeks to benefit, supposing the latter produced only marginally fewer 
objectively good long-term outcomes than the former. However, 
[consequentialism] cannot account for that intuition, since the nature of the means 
by which the objective value is brought about  does not matter...[The] more that is 
brought about by whatever...mechanism, the more meaningful one’s life.  19!
It is essential, however, to distinguish between two ways in which a person can be 
said to do something good. Suppose you are at the beach when you see a child 
drowning in shallow water. You wade in and lift her out, saving her life. Had you not 
done so, your friend Mary would have done so instead (at no cost to Mary or anyone 
else). Here, there is a sense in which you have done something good. It is good that 
the child was saved, and you are the one who saved her. But there is also a sense in 
which you did not do anything good, for had you not waded into the water, the world 
would be no worse a place.  20
CML, as I intend it, says only that it is when one would, by surviving, make a 
contribution to good things that would not otherwise be made that one’s life is 
meaningful now. Hence, according to CML, my ability to press Nozick’s button 
confers meaning on my life now only if, were I not to press it, it would not get pressed 
(or if, were somebody else to press it, there would be some cost associated with that). 
If my friend Mary were standing by, ready to press the button if I did not, or someone 
else would be offered the chance to do so, and at no cost to anybody, then my ability 
to press it, according to CML, does not confer meaning on my life now. Perhaps what 
is leading Metz to think that my ability to press the button does not make my life 
maximally meaningful now is that he is assuming that the button is easy to press, so 
that if I did not press it somebody else would. 
It is for a similar reason that another of Wolf’s arguments for the passion 
requirement, her ‘bored assembly line worker’ , fails. According to Wolf, if an ability 21
to contribute to objectively good things were sufficient for meaning in life, then the 
work of such an assembly line worker would have to add at least some meaning to her 
life. But clearly it does not – her life may be utterly meaningless. 
But assembly line work, very often, does not require a lot of skill or training, and 
so one may be easily replaced in it. If there were many unemployed people looking 
for work, then Wolf’s assembly line worker may not have an ability to contribute to 
anything good in the relevant (Robust) sense, for she may not be making a 
contribution to good things that would not otherwise be made. Of course, if she were 
using her income to feed her family, who would not otherwise be fed, then CML does 
entail that her work adds meaning to life – but this seems exactly right. 
This distinction between two ways in which a person might do good things is 
central to the right account of why our relationships are so important a source of 
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meaning in our lives. The contribution we make to the lives of those who love us – in 
certain cases simply by our continuing to exist (for example, in the case of a severely 
handicapped person or a bedridden grandmother) – is one that cannot be made by 
anyone else. For example, the quality of the pleasures that our company affords those 
who love us is unique – these pleasures could not be provided by anyone else.  22
Here is an additional suggestion for what is confusing philosophers like Metz. 
According to CML, while my ability to press Nozick’s button (assuming that it would 
not otherwise be pressed) confers a great deal of meaning on my life as it is now (i.e., 
adds a great deal to the present momentary meaningfulness of my life), my actually 
pressing it, if this would result in there being nothing more that I could ever do to 
contribute to good things, would mean that, once I had pressed it, my life could never 
again be momentarily meaningful in the slightest. Similarly, while my ability to write 
the cheque to Oxfam, and my ability to go work as a laborer in the poor community, 
may confer roughly equal amounts of meaning on my life as it is now, my actually 
going to work there as a laborer would make my life momentarily meaningful for 
longer, because, were I to do that, I would, at each new moment, be continuing to be a 
source of good things in the world. 
Of course, it is perfectly true that, according to CML, my writing the check to 
Oxfam, if it is for a sufficiently large amount, may do more to make my life 
meaningful considered as a whole than would my going to work in the poor 
community. Some may find this hard to accept. I must admit, though, that I do not. It 
seems plausible to me that the ultra wealthy have an opportunity to add meaning to 
their lives that the vast majority of us lack. This, of course, it must be emphasised, 
does not mean that the ultra wealthy have an opportunity to be either better people or 
better off than the rest of us. A person’s moral worth is not plausibly determined by 
her actual contributions, but only by those she would make if given the chance. And 
meaning in life is not intrinsically good for one. It does not belong on a so-called 
‘objective list’ theory of welfare. 
Finally, suppose an ability to contribute to subjectively good things is also 
sufficient for one’s life to be meaningful at a time (a claim I will be arguing for in 
Section III). In this case, my going to work in the poor community would very likely 
provide me with a kind or source of meaning that no amount of cheque-writing could 
possibly provide. This is because it – unlike cheque-writing – would, in all likelihood, 
be a life-changing and fulfilling experience for me. !
The Paradigms !
Recall the paradigms of meaningful lives: Gandhi’s, Mother Teresa’s, Einstein’s, etc. 
What is distinctive about these? It seems to be nothing other than the enormity of their 
contributions to society. 
To see that this is so, consider that most of us have no idea whether these 
individuals were fulfilled in their lives, whether they had any passion for their 
activities. Most of us know only of their great contributions. Suppose we discovered 
!
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that Einstein thought about mathematics only to silence voices in his head that were 
preventing him from getting to sleep at night, and that he had no passion for anything 
in his life, let alone solving those blasted math problems. Would we cease to think of 
his life as a paradigm of meaningfulness, and instead come to regard it as having been 
completely meaningless? Of course not! If an Einstein like this were to walk up to us 
and complain that his life was meaningless, that there was no point to it, etc., it would 
seem perfectly appropriate for us to insist he was mistaken, and to try to show him all 
the good his ideas were doing.  23!
Ambiguity of “A Life Worth Living” !
As Wolf says, a meaningful life is one that is ‘worth living’. However, there is an 
important ambiguity in the phrase ‘a life worth living’ that I suspect is confusing some 
philosophers who believe that passion is necessary for meaning in life. 
In one sense, a life is worth living if and only if its subject has a self-interested 
reason to go on living it – i.e., just in case it is a life that is worth living for her. For 
this to be so, some passion for one’s activities is arguably required. However, there 
seems also to be a sense in which one’s life can be worth living even if one lacks a 
self-interested reason to go on living it – even, that is, if it is not worth living for one. 
It is worth living in this latter sense just in case one is contributing (in a Robust way) 
to good things. It is a life worth living in this latter sense, I would suggest, that is 
equivalent to what we are engaged in investigating in the literature on meaning in life. 
Consider, once again, crises of meaning. We may, it seems, coherently wonder 
whether our life is worth living, even if we know that it is not worth living for us. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it is plausible that some of us must have lives that 
are worth living for ourselves if any of us is to have a life worth living solely in virtue 
of his contributions to objectively good things. This is because, if no lives were worth 
living for their subjects, then (on the plausible assumption of welfarism about value – 
more on this in Section III) there could be nothing of value in the universe, and so no 
way that any one of us could contribute to anything objectively good. !
It’s A Wonderful Life !
Consider George Bailey in the film It’s A Wonderful Life.  When George discovers he 24
has been framed for fraud and is soon to be arrested, he is so despondent that he goes 
to the town bridge to throw himself off it. He is saved by Clarence, his guardian 
angel, who takes him on a tour of Bedford Falls (now ‘Pottersville’, after the 
nefarious Mr. Potter) as it would have been had he, George, never existed. Everyone 
is much worse off. His mother is a bitter landlady. His friends (the local bartender and 
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policeman) are ungenerous, unhappy people. The local pharmacist, whom George had 
prevented from accidentally poisoning a child, is in prison. George’s younger brother, 
having not been saved from drowning by George when they were children, did not go 
on to become a war hero, and so did not himself save countless lives. Worst of all, 
George’s beloved Mary is a dejected spinster. Seeing all this restores George’s will to 
live, and he is returned to reality, whereupon he dashes home to be reunited with his 
family. 
What is Clarence trying to get George to realise by showing him Pottersville? A 
natural answer is the meaningfulness of his life. What Clarence shows George, 
however, is strictly his contributions to the lives of others. At no point does George’s 
mind turn to any passion he has had for his own activities. Indeed, it is doubtful 
whether George has ever had much passion for his own activities – he is depicted as 
having yearned, his whole life, to get out of Bedford Falls. In any case, the thoughts 
responsible for reigniting George’s will to live, his sense that his life has meaning, are 
only of his importance to the lives of his friends and family. !
III. THE OBJECTIVITY REQUIREMENT 
I will first respond to Wolf’s main argument for the objectivity requirement. I will 
then provide a counterexample to the requirement. 
Sisyphus Fulfilled !
Wolf asks us to consider !
a person who simply loves smoking pot all day, and another (or maybe the same 
person) who is fulfilled doing crossword puzzles, or worse (as personal 
experience will attest), Sudokus. We might also consider more bizarre cases: a 
man who lives to make handwritten copies of the text of War and Peace; or a 
woman whose world revolves around her love for her pet goldfish...[Consider 
also] Sisyphus Fulfilled...who loves stone-rolling more than anything else in the 
(after-)world.  25!
Not only are these people passionate about their activities, Wolf says, their activities 
are subjectively good (i.e., good in virtue of being good for them). But these activities 
clearly add nothing in the way of meaning to their lives. The upshot, Wolf thinks, is 
that activities need to be objectively good if they are to add meaning to one’s life. 
I agree with Wolf that the activities of these people may add nothing to meaning 
in their lives. But I think she is mistaken that these activities are subjectively good. 
Why is this? It is because for something to be good in virtue of being good for 
someone, it must add to this person’s lifetime welfare, and the activities in Wolf’s 
examples, while they may increase their subjects’ momentary welfare at the time of 
experience, add nothing to these people’s lifetime welfare.  
I will not here defend the claim that for something to be good in virtue of being 
!
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good for someone, it must add to this person’s lifetime welfare.  But I do want to say 26
something in defense of the idea that the activities in Wolf’s examples add nothing to 
these people’s lifetime welfare. The reason they add nothing, I believe, is that what 
they provide is ‘just more of the same’. The right theory of lifetime welfare (whether 
it is a hedonistic, desire-satisfactionist, or pluralistic one) should say that having more 
of exactly the same kind of momentary benefit adds nothing in and of itself to lifetime 
welfare (though it may, of course, add instrumentally, by, say, improving one’s ability 
to think clearly or function well). It is only new kinds of momentary benefits – for 
example, qualitatively new pleasures, new kinds of aesthetic experiences, different or 
deeper insights into the nature of things, etc. – that in and of themselves can add 
anything to lifetime welfare. Smoking more pot, making more copies of War and 
Peace, rolling more rocks, etc., adds nothing in and of itself. 
This seems to be why thoughts concerning the cyclical nature of our lives can so 
easily induce crises of meaning. Consider Joel Feinberg’s description of the thoughts 
that led him to suffer crises of meaning while watching shoppers go about their 
business in a bustling marketplace: !
Why are all those people standing in line before the cash registers? In order to 
purchase food. Why do they purchase food? In order to stay alive and healthy. 
Why do they wish to stay alive and healthy? So that they can work at their jobs. 
Why do they want to work? To earn money. Why do they want to earn money? 
So they can purchase food. And so on, around the circle, over and over, with no 
‘significant culmination’ in sight.  27!
It is, I believe, not the lack of a significant culmination per se that can make us feel 
that these people’s lives are meaningless, but the fact that their activities are ‘just 
more of the same’. They seem, for this reason, to add nothing to these people’s 
lifetime welfare, and so to be of no positive value. 
Richard Taylor, also, writes: 
  
We toil after goals, most of them – indeed, every single one of them – of 
transitory significance and, having gained one of them, we immediately set forth 
for the next, as if that one had never been, with this next one being essentially 
more of the same. Look at a busy street any day, and observe the throng going 
hither and thither. To what? Some office or shop, where the same things will be 
done today as were done yesterday, and are done now so they may be repeated 
tomorrow...Most such effort is directed only to the establishment and perpetuation 
of home and family; that is, to the begetting of others who will follow in our steps 
to do more of the same.  28!
If I am right, these thoughts are apt to induce crises of meaning because they depict us 
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as living in such a way that we are not becoming any better off in our lives considered 
as a whole, and so as contributing to nothing of value. 
This account also explains what is missing in some other famously meaningless 
lives – for example, those of David Wiggins’ Hog Farmer (who “grows more corn to 
feed more hogs to buy more land to grow more corn to feed more hogs” ), Wolf’s 29
Blob (who “spends day after day, or night after night, in front of a television set, 
drinking beer and watching situation comedies”), as well as her Idle Aristocrat (who 
“flits about, fighting off boredom, moving from one amusement to another”) . 30
Consider also the lives of Taylor’s Glow Worms: !
This goes on month after month, the blind worm lying there in the barren stillness 
waiting to entrap an occasional bit of nourishment that will only sustain it to 
another bit of nourishment until...Until what? What great thing awaits all this 
long and repetitious effort and makes it worthwhile? Really nothing. The larva 
just transforms itself finally to a tiny winged adult that lacks even mouth parts to 
feed and lives only a day or two. These adults, as soon as they have mated and 
laid eggs, are themselves caught in the threads and are devoured by the 
cannibalist worms, often without having ventured into the day, the only point to 
their existence having now been fulfilled. This has been going on for millions of 
years, and to no end other than that the same meaningless cycle may continue for 
another millions of years.  31!
Finally, consider the young mother discussed in Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine 
Mystique, who tries to account for her feeling of ennui as follows: !
I ask myself why I am so dissatisfied. I’ve got my health, fine children, a lovely 
new home, enough money...It’s as if ever since you were a little girl, there’s 
always been somebody or something that will take care of your life: your parents, 
or college or falling in love, or having a child, or moving to a new house. Then 
you wake up one morning and there’s nothing to look forward to.  32!
In discussing her case, Peter Singer notes that it was mainly women who experienced 
such a loss of purpose in the fifties, because !
most men, but relatively few women, worked in jobs that held out the prospect of 
a promotion, an increase in responsibility and power...So when one morning a 
man wakes up and asks himself, ‘Is this all there is to my life?’ he can quieten the 
doubts by thinking about that coming glorious day when he gets to move up to a 
more important position, with higher pay and more responsibility. That is why, as 
both employers and unions have found, a career structure, a ladder leading 
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upwards, is often more crucial for job satisfaction than actual rates of pay. In 
contrast, for a housewife there is no promotion. Romance will fade, and the 
children will need their mother less and less.  33!
For all these individuals, there is (as far as they can see) nothing new on the horizon. 
If I am right, this means that (once again, from their persective) there is no further 
increase possible in their own levels of lifetime welfare, and so nothing even 
subjectively good that depends on their own continued existence. 
I conclude that Wolf’s argument does not establish that one’s activities need to be 
objectively good if they are to add meaning to one’s life. While it is true that the 
activities she mentions probably add nothing in and of themselves to meaning in their 
subjects’ lives, they are not, as Wolf claims, subjectively good. !
The Shipwrecked Botanist !
I want now to provide an example of a life that is only subjectively good, but seems 
meaningful nonetheless. Consider !
The Shipwrecked Botanist. A botanist has been shipwrecked alone on a desert 
island with all of his books and instruments. He cannot believe his luck! Finally, 
he has an opportunity to fulfill his long-held ambition of studying exotic desert 
island flora. !
We might add that he is a talented artist, with a keen interest in tropical landscapes, 
and has been shipwrecked along with all of his painting supplies. 
Could the life of this botanist be meaningful on the island? Certainly, it could be. 
Indeed, it is tempting to think that it could be far more meaningful there than back in 
his homeland – especially if we assume that he loathed his day job, had little spare 
time to pursue his passions, and had no especially close friends or family. But the 
moment he washed up on this island was exactly the moment at which his life ceased 
to be objectively valuable, for he is all alone on this island. (Assume that he will never 
be discovered or have any effect whatsoever ever again on the lives of others.) 
I am here assuming welfarism about value, the view that something can be good 
only by being good for some being or beings. Wolf may reject this assumption. 
Indeed, she writes (though not in response to the sort of objection I have raised here): !
Creating art, adding to our knowledge of the world,...seem intuitively to deserve 
classification as valuable activities, even if they do not bring about obvious 
improvement in human or animal welfare.  34!
Similarly, the mere “exercise of virtue and talent – of intellectual creativity and 
integrity, of patience, discipline, and determination – has value in itself”.  35
If Wolf were right that such things are valuable independently of their 
!
 Singer, How Are We To Live?, p. 211.33
 Wolf, Meaning in Life, p. 37.34
 Wolf, Meaning in Life, p. 106.35
contribution to people’s welfare, then the shipwrecked botanist could, even on her 
Fitting Fulfillment View, have a meaningful life on the island. But it is very hard to 
believe that these things are objectively valuable. What is the point of making 
beautiful objects, gaining knowledge of the world, or developing skills, if nobody – 
not even oneself – will benefit from these things? Intuitively, it would be better to 
confer even the smallest benefit upon somebody than to do any of these things.  36!
Lifetime Meaningfulness !
Before concluding, I wish to make one final point. If CML is true, then it may be that 
one’s life can be meaningful considered as a whole only if one contributes to 
objectively good things. Why is this? According to CML, a person’s life was 
meaningful considered as a whole just in case the world was (or will be) made better 
in some way as a result of this person’s having existed. But there is reason to think 
that one’s having existed can be good only objectively. It cannot be subjectively good, 
because it cannot be good for oneself. Why can’t it be good for oneself? Here’s why: !
(1) Something is good for a person only if it makes him better off in some way 
than he would otherwise have been. !
(2) Had a person not existed, then he would not have been, and so would not have 
had a level of welfare. !
Therefore, !
(3) One’s having existed cannot make one better off than one would otherwise 
have been. !
Therefore, !
(4) One’s having existed cannot be good for oneself.  37!
Suppose this is right. Perhaps it is a failure to distinguish between one’s life’s being 
meaningful at a time and one’s having had a meaningful life considered as a whole 
that explains why some philosophers are tempted to think that meaning at a time 
requires an ability to contribute to objectively good things. !
IV. CONCLUSION !
!
 It is beyond the scope of this essay to give a full defense of welfarism. For more on 36
welfarism, see Bramble (2014) and Roger Crisp & Andrew Moore, ‘Welfarism in moral 
theory’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996), pp. 598-613. Note that, while 
welfarism provides support for CML, CML neither entails nor relies on welfarism.
 Something like this argument has been suggested by many philosophers. See, for example, 37
John Broome, Ethics Out Of Economics (Cambridge, 1999), p. 168. Note that an advocate of 
CML needn’t accept this argument, and is not committed to (4).
I want to conclude with a clear statement of why, if CML is true, almost every human 
life is somewhat meaningful, both at most times and considered as a whole. It is 
because (1) for the vast majority of us, continuing to exist at any given time would 
result in our becoming better off in some way in our life considered as a whole, or at 
least in one of our friends or loved ones becoming better off in some way in his life 
considered as a whole, and (2) most of us will make, during the course of our lives, at 
least one person besides ourselves better off in some way in his life considered as a 
whole.  38!
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